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Reform #1. Why Ukraine has to reform its gas sector
Wojciech Konończuk
In April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed a long-awaited law on the gas sector which paves 
the way for the extremely difficult process of reforming and de-monopolising the Ukrainian gas 
sector. The law will come into force on 1 October 2015 and involves  the break-up of the state-
-owned company Naftohaz, the current monopolist, and the gradual creation of a competitive 
gas market in line with the so-called Third Energy Package. At the same time, a threefold incre-
ase in the price of gas paid by individual customers and the public sector was introduced. The 
price had been subsidised for years and no previous government had ever decided to raise it.
The comprehensive reform of the gas sector is one of the most important and most difficult re-
forms Ukraine has to implement. Its success will be of fundamental importance for the Ukrainian 
state due to its  impact on several major areas of the state’s functioning. Without the marketi-
sation of gas prices and an improvement in Naftohaz’s financial standing (in 2014, the compa-
ny’s deficit accounted for 7% of Ukraine’s GDP), it will be impossible to reform Ukraine’s public 
finances to end the long-lasting economic crisis. Without an improvement in Ukraine’s energy 
efficiency, which currently is one of the world’s lowest, it will be impossible to reduce the coun-
try’s dependence on the import of gas. Successful implementation of the reform will also be im-
portant in the context of the future of Ukrainian-Russian relations. The question of gas supplies 
has been one of the major aspects of this relationship since 1991. Another extremely important 
consequence of the reform will be to eliminate the main source of income from corruption in 
Ukraine., which has benefited the ruling elite since the 1990s. Corruption seems to be the reason 
behind the reluctance of all previous governments in Kyiv to reform the gas sector.
Ultimately, successful implementation of the reform will be a milestone for Ukraine in its at-
tempt to leave the post-Soviet paradigm of how the state, its political elites, its economy and 
society function. However, the significant changes implemented so far in the gas sector have 
been insufficient, and require the adoption of several other laws and introduction of further 
price increases. It remains an open question whether the Ukrainian government will have suf-
ficient determination and political will to complete the reform which has just been launched.
A gas-dependent state
Gas accounts for around 35% of Ukraine’s ener-
gy balance. However, due to its economic and 
political significance, the gas sector has been 
one of the most important dimensions of the 
Ukrainian state’s functioning for over two de-
cades now. In the peak years of 2000–2006, 
the level of annual gas consumption was 70–75 
bcm, including around 20 bcm from domestic 
extraction1. The volume of Ukraine’s gas im-
ports (mainly from Russia) placed it among the 
world’s five largest gas importing countries, 
1 In the early 1990s, Ukraine consumed over 100 bcm of 
gas per year, but in subsequent years the level of con-
sumption fell to approximately 75–85 bcm.
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and made it the largest single recipient of gas 
from Russia. Due to a gradual increase in the 
price of Russian gas, and also the economic cri-
sis, Ukraine’s gas consumption fell from 59.3 
bcm in 2011 to 50.4 bcm in 2013 and 42.6 bcm 
in 2014 (see Appendix: chart 1). The paradox 
of the situation was that despite Ukraine being 
a large gas consumer, the price of gas on its 
domestic market was one of Europe’s lowest.
Ukraine’s great demand for gas, which is dispro-
portionate to the size of its economy, results 
from the fact that this country has one of the 
world’s lowest energy efficiency ratios2. In Ukra-
ine, the amount of energy needed to generate 
one unit of GDP is three times larger than the 
average amount calculated for OECD countries3. 
The Ukrainian industrial sector’s energy efficien-
cy level stands at 51% of the EU’s average level; 
in the case of the service sector it is 46%, of the 
construction sector 11.3%, and of the housing 
sector 61.9%. Such low values are due to seve-
ral major factors, including outdated heating 
technology, a backward industry sector and the 
lack of thermal insulation on residential buildin-
gs. This means that Ukraine has a great and still 
unused potential for energy savings, which in 
2011 was estimated at 26 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent, corresponding to 29.3 bcm of gas4. 
Almost a quarter of these potential savings co-
uld be achieved in metallurgy, which was a tra-
ditional foundation of Ukrainian industry and 
the main source of the country’s exports.
2 According to the Enerdata Global Energy Statistical Year-
book 2015, to produce one unit of GDP Ukraine needs 
0.320 kilogram of oil equivalent. Worse ratios were record-
ed only for Russia (0.340) and Uzbekistan. For comparison, 
Poland’s is 0.129, Germany’s 0.106.
3 Taking account of the purchasing power parity. Data after: 
Ukraine 2012, International Energy Agency, OECD/IEA 2012.
4 Ukrainian Energy Index 2013
In recent years, Ukraine has seen only a small 
improvement in its implementation of energy-
saving technologies. The level of energy effi-
ciency in the industrial sector grew by around 
1.5% a year, whereas the figures for the housing 
sector experienced a gradual decline of 0.2%5. 
The latter value was mainly caused by the sub-
sidy of gas prices, which offered no encoura-
gement to users to save energy. According to 
Naftohaz’s CEO Andriy Kobolev, if investments 
worth US$10 bn were made, within 3–5 years 
it would be possible to save 5–6 bcm of gas 
annually, a volume accounting for a quarter of 
gas imports in 20146. This calculation mainly 
applies to the heat and power generation sec-
tor and to private households.
Gas-related corruption income
Since the creation of the independent Ukrainian 
state, the gas trade has been the main source of 
corrupt profits for the ruling elite. This concer-
ned both the import of gas from Russia and the 
non-transparent trade in domestically extrac-
ted gas. The key role in these mechanisms was 
played by companies which served as interme-
diaries in the supply of gas from Russia; these 
companies had ties to the governments of both 
countries7. The total lack of transparency in Naf-
tohaz was equally important. Naftohaz, Ukra-
ine’s largest enterprise, fell prey to all the sub-
sequent governments, which in this way gained 
control over the revenues from the domestic 
gas trade. Corrupt gas schemes boomed during 
Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994–2005), be-
came consolidated during Viktor Yushchenko’s 
rule (2005–2010)8 and continued under Viktor 
5 For comparison, in 1996–2010 the ratio of energy effi-
ciency recorded for Poland increased by 42%, including 
the ratio recorded for households, which increased by 
34%. http://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/pro-
files/poland-efficiency-trends-polish-version.pdf
6 An interview with Andriy Kobolev: АндрейКоболев: “Безр
ыночнойценырынкагазанебудет!”, zn.ua, 5 June 2015.
7 Mainly Itera (1995–2002), EuralTransGas (2002–2005) 
and RosUkrEnergo (2006–2009).
8 See e.g. It’s a Gas-Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine-
Gas Trade, Global Witness 2006. 
Since Ukraine became independent, the 
gas trade has been the largest source of 
income from corruption for the ruling elite.
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Yanukovych (2010–2014). Understanding the 
mechanism of the dependence of post-Soviet 
Ukraine’s elites on corruption income genera-
ted by the gas sector is one of the prerequisi-
tes for understanding how the Ukrainian state 
functioned after 1991 and why it is currently 
undergoing a systemic crisis9.
None of the governments of post-independen-
ce Ukraine has been interested in changing 
the system which had a damaging effect on 
the state, but at the same time brought mas-
sive illegal profits to individuals in power. As 
a consequence, Kyiv became unable to devi-
se an efficient energy policy or implement re-
forms (including adopting legislative solutions 
in the gas sector10 promoted by the EU, and bo-
osting the country’s energy efficiency). This has 
further magnified the scale of the problems. 
Systemic corruption has become the main fe-
ature of the Ukrainian gas sector, thereby con-
tributing to a further weakening of the state. 
Moscow also used gas-based schemes to corrupt 
the Ukrainian elite, which aggravated Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russia. A key moment in this 
process was January 200911, when the then Pri-
9 This model has been described in detail by Margari-
ta Balmaceda. See M. Balmaceda, Energy dependency, 
politics and corruption in the former Soviet Union, Lon-
don-New York 2009 and The politics of energy depen-
dency. Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania between domestic 
oligarchs and Russian pressure, Toronto 2013.
10 This requirement is a result of Ukraine’s membership of the 
Energy Community.
11 Until now, it is not clear why Yulia Tymoshenko, an individual 
with extensive experience in the gas sector, decided to sign 
this unfavourable agreement. What is certain is that one of 
her motives was to eliminate the RosUkrEnergo (RUE) com-
pany from the gas market. The company was co-owned by 
the oligarch Dmytro Firtash, who at that time was in conflict 
with Tymoshenko. In the context of the upcoming presiden-
tial elections, Tymoshenko intended to deprive Firtash of his 
revenues from the trade in gas, which could have been used 
against her in the pre-election campaign.
me Minister Yulia Tymoshenko signed an extre-
mely unfavourable gas contract with Russia. Its 
main consequence involved a rise in the price of 
Russian gas to a level which turned out to be one 
of the highest paid by Gazprom’s foreign clients. 
This contributed to a further decline in Ukrainian 
public finances (more on this later in the text). 
The unreformed energy sector, in particular Naf-
tohaz’s rapidly rising deficit, had a negative im-
pact on other sectors of the economy, and be-
came one of the causes of the drop in Ukraine’s 
GDP which has been observed since mid-2012. 
The elimination (or at least the considerable re-
duction) of the income from corruption obtained 
from the gas sector is therefore a precondition 
of the complex reform of the Ukrainian economy 
and of an improvement of political standards. 
Naftohaz – an account in the red
Endemic corruption, combined with the rising 
prices of Russian gas12 and the subsidies of the 
prices paid by individual customers13, further 
aggravated the state of Naftohaz’s finances. In 
Ukraine, recipients of gas can be separated into 
two categories: (1) clients who pay a regulated 
(subsidised) price for gas: individual customers, 
the public sector, and heat and power conglo-
merates; and (2) the industrial sector and the 
business sector which pay market prices. The 
share of the first category of clients is around 
55% of total gas consumption (see Appendix: 
chart 2). Simultaneously with the price of gas 
for a large portion of customers being held at 
an artificially low level, there was a gradual rise 
in the cost of gas purchased from Gazprom. In 
2005–2007, the annual purchase of Russian gas 
accounted for around 4.5% of GDP, whereas in 
2011–2012 this increased to 8.5% of GDP (see 
Appendix: chart 3). 
12 The price of 1000 m3 of gas purchased from Gazprom 
rose from US$180 in 2008 to US$259 in 2009 and to 
US$427 in 2012. In 2012, the average price of gas paid 
by Gazprom’s clients in the EU was US$385.
13 The price of gas on the domestic market paid by individ-
ual customers and the public sector was approximately 
4–5 times lower than the price paid to Gazprom.
Eliminating the profits from corruption in 
the gas field is a condition for the thor-
ough restructuring of the Ukrainian econ-
omy and raising standards in politics.
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The high price of Russian gas drove up Nafto-
haz’s debt. The company financed its opera-
tions by issuing bonds which were then bought 
by the state. This led to the de facto shifting 
of the company’s massive debt onto the Ukra-
inian state budget, which in turn contributed 
to a gradual aggravation of the condition of 
Ukrainian public finances, and of its macroeco-
nomic stability, including the country’s current 
account (the share of gas in Ukraine’s total im-
ports increased to 17%). This was also one of 
the main reasons for the increase in the bud-
get deficit from 2% of GDP in 2008 to 7–9% 
in 2009–201014. In 2014, Naftohaz’s deficit was 
110 bn hryvnias (around US$9 bn). This sum 
was covered from the Central Bank’s currency 
reserves15. This means that the company’s defi-
cit accounted for 7% of Ukraine’s GDP16. Witho-
ut the help granted by the state, Naftohaz wo-
uld have gone bankrupt long ago.
Naftohaz’s debt has mainly been caused by the 
fact that the supply of gas to individual custo-
mers and to public sector bodies was subsidised, 
and by the fact that some industrial conglome-
rates, in particular from the chemical sector, as 
well as power plants failed to pay the amounts 
they owed for their gas supplies. The size of the 
deficit is all the more striking when comparing 
the company’s debt, which was covered in 2014 
by the state (US$9 bn), with the total cost of gas 
imports from Russia and the West (US$5.7 bn). 
A plan to reform Naftohaz
The company’s disastrous state means that any 
reform of Ukraine’s public finances (and its eco-
nomy more generally) would be virtually impos-
sible without reforming Naftohaz. This is why in 
recent years17, restructuring Naftohaz and mar-
14 Ukraine 2012, a report by the International Energy Asso-
ciation, OECD/IEA 2012.
15 Naftohaz’s debt was 1.5 times higher than Ukraine’s en-
tire budget deficit; http://censor.net.ua/n338512
16 In 2014, Ukraine’s GDP was 1566 billion hryvnias (ap-
proximately US$132 billion). 
17 In 2008, 2010, 2014 and 2015 respectively.
ketising the gas prices for individual customers 
have remained top priority issues in all the IMF’s 
aid programmes for Ukraine. Successive gover-
nments of Ukraine have opposed the plans to 
increase the price of gas for individual custo-
mers because regulated gas rates had formed 
the basis of the state’s social policy for years. 
The lack of political will within the Yanukovych 
administration to marketise gas rates was the 
reason for the suspension of the IMF program-
me worth US$15.5 bn agreed in June 2010. De-
spite Kyiv’s attempts to resume dialogue with 
the IMF, no compromise had been reached by 
the end of Yanukovych’s rule due to the lack of 
agreement on the issue18.
The IMF’s programme worth US$17.5 bn, which 
has been in force since February 2015, sees re-
structuring Naftohaz as its priority goal. This 
would involve reducing the company’s defi-
cit to 3.1% of GDP in 2015, to 0.2% of GDP in 
2016, and making the company profitable in 
2017. Another condition determining Ukraine’s 
chances for receiving another loan involved 
raising the price of gas for private households 
by 231%–326%, depending on the group of 
recipients, and a 67% increase in the price of 
heating. However, even as drastic an increase 
as this would not guarantee a full marketisa-
tion of the price of gas and heating. This is 
why the IMF’s programmes provide for another 
two increases to be introduced in April 2016 
and April 2017. To alleviate the impact of the 
18 The failure of the IMF’s aid programme resulted in Kyiv re-
ceiving a loan from Russia worth US$15 billion in Decem-
ber 2013 (although Ukraine actually received only the first 
instalment of the loan worth US$3 billion). The funds were 
intended to stabilise the economic situation ahead of the 
presidential elections planned for the beginning of 2015.
Naftohaz’s deficit amounted to 7% of 
Ukraine’s GDP in 2014; without state aid, 
the company would have had to declare 
bankruptcy long ago.
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growing prices on society, the government 
has introduced subsidies worth 24 bn hryvnias 
(around US$1.2 bn) for the poorest customers. 
Moreover, Kyiv and the IMF expect that the 
price increase and the requirement to install 
gas meters in households will contribute to 
a reduction in the level of gas consumption19.
The increase in the price of gas for individual 
customers has been criticised by some of the 
coalition parties (Batkivshchyna, the Radi-
cal Party) and by the media, which claim that 
much cheaper domestically extracted gas co-
uld be used to cover the demand of individual 
customers20. The IMF and several experts have 
put forward reasonable arguments suggesting 
that holding the price of gas for individual cu-
stomers at a level several times lower than the 
market price has been one of the main causes 
of corruption in the energy sector.
Aside from the rise in the price of gas for in-
dividual customers and for the public sector, 
intensified activities aimed at collecting the 
amounts due for the supply of gas to customers 
have been planned with the aim of improving 
Naftohaz’s financial standing. According to 
estimates, as of mid-August 2015 the value of 
19 As at the end of May 2015, gas meters have been in-
stalled in 71% of households (only 16% in Kyiv). В Україні 
встановлено десятимільйонний лічильник газу, 28 July 
2015.
20 In 2014, the state-owned companies Ukrgazdobycha and 
Ukrnafta extracted 15.1 bcm and 1.7 bcm of gas respec-
tively, whereas the volume extracted by private gas ex-
traction companies was 3.3 bcm. An additional 0.3 bcm of 
gas was extracted by Chernomorneftegaz on the Crimean 
Shelf, over which Ukraine lost control after the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia. In August 2014, levies imposed on oil 
and gas extraction companies increased twofold. This re-
sulted in a 5.7% decrease in gas extraction in January–July 
2015. In July 2015, a draft law providing for a reduction in 
the levies for companies operating in the gas sector was 
registered with the Ukrainian parliament.
customers’ liabilities towards the company was 
nearly US$1 bn, 70% of which are liabilities ge-
nerated by heat and power plants21. 
The successful diversification of gas imports, 
achieved by launching reverse gas supplies 
from the West, in particular via Slovakia, has 
contributed to an improvement in Naftohaz’s 
financial condition. This has become an impor-
tant argument in Kyiv’s talks with Gazprom 
over a possible reduction in the price of Russian 
gas. The expected expansion of the capacity 
of pipelines running via Slovakia to the current 
14.5 bcm per year, combined with the techni-
cal maximum capacity of the interconnections 
with Hungary and Poland (6.1 bcm and 1.5 bcm 
respectively) would make it possible for Ukraine 
– for the first time in its independent history – 
to abandon the need to purchase Russian gas. 
Aside from the law on the gas market, this has 
been the greatest success of Ukrainian energy 
policy since the end of the ‘Euromaidan’. In the 
first half of 2015, Naftohaz imported 6.1 bcm of 
gas from the EU and 3.7 bcm from Russia (62% 
and 38% respectively)22. 
A breakthrough gas market law 
The reform of the energy sector has become 
one of the major goals announced by the post
-Euromaidan government. In March 2014, there 
was a change in Naftohaz’s leadership, and An-
driy Kobolev, then aged 35, was appointed the 
company’s CEO. In July 2014, the parliament 
amended the law to allow Western investors to 
take part in modernising the Ukrainian system 
of gas transit pipelines. However, specific refor-
m-related actions aimed at changing the status 
quo in the gas sector lasted several months. On 
9 April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed 
a gas market law23, which is one of the most 
21 Заборгованість під приємств-боржникі вперед НАК 
«Нафтогаз України», Naftohaz, 20 August 2015.
22 Нафтогаз оприлюднив статистику цін імпортованого 
газу за другий квартал 2015 року, Naftohaz, 17.08.2015
23 http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/329-19/page
Reform of the energy sector has become 
one of the most important goals announced 
by the post-Euromaidan government.
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significant reforms adopted by the new gover-
nment so far. The parliament’s vote in favour 
of the new law (290 votes in favour were cast), 
which had been written in close cooperation 
with the Energy Community Secretariat, was in 
fact forced upon it by the IMF, which saw it as 
a precondition of granting Ukraine another aid 
package worth US$17.5 bn.
The main purpose of the law is to implement 
legal acts in Ukrainian legislation which regula-
te the EU gas sector (including the Third Ener-
gy Package). This, in turn, is intended to create 
a competitive gas market in Ukraine in all seg-
ments of the market. The law sets legal and or-
ganisational rules for how the gas market should 
function, provides for gas market de-monopoli-
sation, offers consumer protection and enables 
consumers to freely choose their gas supplier. 
The newly-adopted law reveal the need to bre-
ak up Naftohaz, which currently combines the 
function of gas producer with the tasks of trans-
porting, storing and distributing gas. Gas pipe-
lines and underground storage tanks will be se-
parated into independent companies controlled 
by the state, with access to them guaranteed to 
all market participants. It will also be necessary 
to form subsidiaries of Naftohaz which will be 
entrusted with the extraction and distribution 
of gas. As a consequence, several separate gas 
network operators and gas distribution and sto-
rage companies will emerge which will operate 
on the basis of certificates issued by an indepen-
dent regulatory office. Operators will be obliged 
to provide all market participants with access to 
the gas transmission network.
The new gas law is intended to deprive Naftohaz 
of its current status as a monopolist and to foster 
competition on the gas market. It is also expec-
ted to stimulate the investment activity which is 
necessary to modernise the gas sector. The law 
will also strike at the interests of some oligarchs 
who control around 70% of the regional compa-
nies which distribute and sell gas (the so-called 
oblgazes)24, because it obligates these companies 
to pay for access to gas networks (previously, 
such access was free of charge). At the same time, 
the law fails to answer the question as to what 
should be done with the mostly privately-owned 
oblgazes which manage regional gas networks 
(which are state-owned entities) and at the same 
time sell gas to end users, which is against the 
newly-adopted rules requiring the transport and 
distribution tasks to be separated25.
The law will come into force on 1 October 2015 
(and some of its provisions will come into force 
several months later), but a number of issues 
related to the new shape of the gas market will 
have to be regulated in several other laws. The 
current law also fails to answer a number of im-
portant questions, such as the role of Naftohaz 
after the market becomes de-monopolised, or 
the planned date of the company’s split into 
several operators. It should be assumed that it 
will take a long time to adopt further laws, and 
new entities can be expected to enter the mar-
ket once these new laws are adopted. Currently, 
work is under way on submitting a draft law to 
parliament on creating an independent energy 
market regulator to replace the current National 
Committee for State Regulation of Energy and 
Utilities (NKREKP)26. According to the draft law, 
24 Mainly Dmytro Firtash, who owns controlling packages in 
21 oblgazes and minority packages of a further 10; and 
Rinat Akhmetov, who controls the Kyiv-based company 
Kyivenergo, among others. http://gazeta.zn.ua/energy_
market/s-kazhdoy-konforki-_.html
25 Andriy Kobolev stressed this in one of his interviews. 
Андрей Коболев: Европейцы ждали, когда мы 
заговорим о посреднике, Ukrainska Pravda, 29 May 2015.
26 NKREKP was created in September 2014 by a decree by 
President Petro Poroshenko, and is supervised by the Pres-
ident. It was intended to replace the National Committee 
for State Regulation of Energy (NKRE), a quasi-regulator 
which had existed since 1995. Provisions concerning NK-
REKP were also included in the gas market law.
The law concerning the gas market will 
serve to deprive Naftohaz of its status as 
the gas monopolist and create the condi-
tions for market competition to emerge.
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NKREKP is to be replaced with a new, fully inde-
pendent regulator with a considerably broader 
scope of competence, which would enable it 
to carry out investigative activities, initiatives 
aimed at protecting market competition, and 
impose fines. The law is expected to be in full 
compliance with the EU’s Directive 2009/72/EC, 
a part of the Third Energy Package. 
Following the adoption of the gas market law, 
the Ukrainian parliament passed another two 
laws intended to improve standards in the gas 
sector. The IMF made the granting of another 
loan instalment conditional on Ukraine ad-
opting these two laws. On 14 May 2015, the 
parliament passed a law stabilising the financial 
standing of Naftohaz. The law expands the sco-
pe of legal solutions available to the company 
to collect its outstanding debts, including from 
public utility units, heat and power plants and 
industrial facilities. On 16 June 2015, a law on 
increasing transparency in the energy sector 
was passed which obligates extraction compa-
nies to publish their financial statements and 
reports on their business activity. The new law 
targets mainly state-owned companies such as 
Ukrnafta and Ukrgazvydobuvanya, and its aim 
is to introduce the requirement to maintain 
transparency and to boost the attractiveness of 
the mining sector in the eyes of investors.
Prospects for gas market reform
The gas sector reforms carried out so far by 
Ukraine’s post-Revolution government can be 
viewed as ambivalent. On the one hand, an 
extremely important law on the gas market 
has been passed and gas prices for individu-
al customers have seen an increase of around 
three-fold. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that the government launched its first 
real reforms as late as a year after the events 
of the Euromaidan. Moreover, the adoption of 
reforms has been de facto forced upon Ukraine 
by the IMF, which made granting of a rescue 
loan (without which Ukraine would have de-
faulted) conditional upon implementing these 
reforms. It should also be emphasised that the 
gas market law adopted in April 2015 is not the 
end, but just the beginning of reforms of the 
Ukrainian gas market. On its own, this single, 
albeit very important legal act will not trigger 
radical changes in the gas sector; it will have 
to be supplemented by further laws. Preparing 
a full set of standards and legal solutions to 
form the foundations of the new gas market is 
likely to take several months, if not years. For the 
time being, Naftohaz has maintained its mono-
poly in all domestic market segments and the 
status of the sole importer of gas27. The organi-
sational details and the schedule of the planned 
break-up of the monopolist remain unknown.
Increasing the price of gas for individual custo-
mers and for the public sector by around 300% 
does not mean the end of the marketisation of 
gas prices. However, this has been an admitte-
dly bold move which all previous governments 
failed to make, and which the government he-
aded by Arseniy Yatsenyuk had also tried to 
postpone. The memorandum signed with the 
IMF provides for another two price increases 
(the last one is to be introduced in April 2017), 
which is intended to end the years-long process 
of subsidising gas prices. At the same time, the 
decision involving such a drastic price increase 
27 In November 2014, the Ukrainian government restored 
Naftohaz’s monopoly on the import of gas, which had 
been lifted in 2012. The decision was criticised by the En-
ergy Community. Despite the fact that the government’s 
decree remained in force until 28 February 2015, Naftohaz 
carried out 99% of gas imports until early July 2015. This 
was because it had booked almost the entire volume of 
gas available in pipelines which receive gas from the EU. 
Коболев: «Нафтогаз»  предложил частным компаниям 
импортировать газ в Украину, Business.ua, 10 July 2015.
Gas reform can be seen as the ‘mother 
of all reforms’, upon which the success of 
Ukraine’s transformations will depend to 
a considerable degree.
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will impact consumers starting from the upco-
ming autumn heating season, and will likely 
trigger social discontent. Especially as the rise 
of housing rent has been accompanied by the 
pauperisation of society cased by the ongoing 
economic crisis. The government’s decision to 
introduce the price increase has been criticised 
not only by the opposition but also by some of 
the coalition parties.
It remains an open question whether the cu-
rrent government will have the necessary po-
litical will to continue gas sector reforms. For 
this to be possible, further laws will need to be 
prepared and voted on by the Ukrainian parlia-
ment. Furthermore, it should be expected that 
some of the beneficiaries of the old system will 
oppose the reform, fearing that it might un-
dermine their major interests, and will attempt 
to block it. Without a consistent and full im-
plementation of the gas sector reform, which 
should include increasing the energy efficien-
cy of the economy and of the public sector, it 
will be impossible to improve the condition of 
Ukraine’s public finances, reduce its budget de-
ficit, improve its current account, reduce inco-
me from corruption and improve standards in 
Ukrainian politics. In this context, the gas sec-
tor reform can be considered ‘the mother of all 
reforms’, and its successful implementation will 
determine the chances for success of the entire 
process of transformation currently under way 
in Ukraine.
APPENDIX
Figure 1. Gas consumption in Ukraine, and the share of imported gas in total 
consumption 1991-2015 (bcm) 
Data: Naftohaz
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Figure 2. Gas consumption in Ukraine 1998–2014 divided into categories (bcm)
Figure 3. Share of gas in Ukrainian import, and value of gas import as share of GDP
Data: Naftohaz
Data: Author’s calculations based on Ukrstat data
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